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BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
that the proviso found in section 57n 1 T which allows for a grace period of
thirty days can be construed to be included within the amendment to, the
"executory contract" provision so that timely filing can be possible.
It is clear that the amendments will, in addition to their expressed
intended purpose, to wit, the elimination of preferences to creditors not
previously required to file, provide a cutoff date after which confirmation
of the plan can be accomplished with a degree of certainty. While, as we
have seen, there are certain incidental drawbacks, the overall picture would
seem to represent a positive step.
STEPHEN M. RICHMOND
CORPORATIONS
PROFESSIONAL INCORPORATION
Massachusetts recently amended the corporation section of its general
laws by the addition of chapter 156A, the professional corporation statute. 1
This brings to forty the number of states which have enacted similar legisla-
tion. The primary purpose of the statute is to allow self-employed profes-
sionals to incorporate so that they may be recognized as "employees" within
the definition of Internal Revenue Rulings,2 and thus qualify for profit
sharing and pension plans and the tax benefits to be derived therefrom. The
enactment embraces specifically enumerated professions, i.e., registered
physicians and surgeons, chiropodists, physical therapists; dentists, veter-
inarians, optometrists and attorneys admitted to practice in the courts of
the Commonwealth under chapter 221 of the Massachusetts General Laws.
Professional corporation statutes represent an attempt to eliminate the
traditional and statutory prohibitions which have prevented the so-called
professionals from rendering professional services through the corporate
form. In Massachusetts, there are express statutory provisions prohibiting
ordinary business corporations from practicing laws or dentistry. 4 While
there are no similar statutory interdictions applicable to the other groups
17 While this may involve a rather tenuous construction of such terms as "avoidance
of lien" or "recovery" of funds, this would nonetheless seem to be a reasonable way
to solve an apparently unforseen problem.
1 Mass. Acts, 1963, ch. 654, adopted August 19, 1963, effective November 15, 1963. This
note will be concerned primarily with the Massachusetts professional corporation statute.
It is similar in most particulars to professional corporation and association statutes
enacted in other jurisdictions. The purposes for which it was enacted and the policies
which dictated its form and provisions are sufficiently identifiable with those of other
jurisdictions so that it may serve to illustrate these purposes and policies and the
functional possibilities made available by such enactments.
2 Professional partnerships, composed of attorneys, physicians, etc., are entitled
to the same privileges as corporations in the establishment of pension trusts for the
benefit of bona fide .employees of such partnerships. However, a general partner, as
such, is not an employee of the partnership and is precluded from participating in
the benefits of a trust. I.T. 3350, 194041 Cum, Bull. 65.
a Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 221, 46 (1958).
4 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann, ch. 112, 49 (1958).
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specified in the statute, such restrictions may be implied. These statutes
make it illegal to practice such professions without being duly registered .°
A corporation cannot possess the personal qualities, such as good moral
character, required to obtain a license, and thus, a corporation rendering
professional services would be practicing illegally,° absent statutory author-
ity. At first glance such reasoning may appear to be very superficial, but
there are cogent reasons for the restrictions. There is an inherent risk in per-
mitting the interposition of the corporate entity between the professional and
his patient or client. The professional would be respongible to the corporate
management, which might consist of non-professionals, not subject to licens-
ing boards or the compulsion of professional ethics. The employer's directives
could well result in the rendition of services for the main benefit of the em-
ployer, and not in accordance with the best interests of patient or client?'
The dangers inherent in allowing professionals to render services through
the corporate entity are precluded by the provisions of chapter 15M. The
statute allows the corporation to render only one specific type of professional
service,8
 and all shareholders, officers and directors are required to be
licensed to perform that one service.° Shares of the corporation's capital
stock may only be transferred to persons registered to perform the same
professional service 1° The jurisdiction of licensing boards extends to all
professionals, notwithstanding such person is an officer, director, shareholder
or employee of a professional corporation?' Finally, the statute does not
alter the liability of the professional, in the rendition of professional services,
to the person receiving such services. 12 These provisions avoid divided
allegiances and place the corporation as a whole, through its various parts,
under the control of the appropriate licensing board. Attorneys will be
allowed the use of the statute to the extent that the Supreme • Judicial
Court approves and makes such terms and conditions as it deems neces-
sary and appropriate.' 3 In view of the obvious effort to maintain pro-
fessional relationships and responsibilities, it seems apparent that former
5 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 112 (1958): physicians and surgeons, § 6; chiropodists,
§ 14; optometrists, § 72A; veterinarians, § 59. Veterinary hospitals and companies are
allowed to incorporate in Massachusetts provided that the veterinarian receives compensa-
tion for his services directly from his clients, and not through the corporation.
0 McMurdo v. Getter, 298 Mass. 363, 10 N.E.2d 139 (1937); Kerner v. United
Medical Serv., Inc., 362 Ill. 442, 200 N.E. 157 (1936).
7 See In Re Co-op. Law Co., 198 N.Y. 479, 92 N.E. 15 (1910); McMurdo v.
Getter, supra note 6; In Re Opinion of the Justices, 289 Mass. 607, 194 N.E. 313 (1935).
Contra, State Electro-Medical Institute v. State, 74 Neb. 40, 103 N.W. 1078 (1905).
8 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 156A, § 4 (Supp. 1963).
9 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 156A, § 8 (Supp. 1963).
10 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 156A, § 7 (Supp. 1963).
11 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 156A, § 11 (Supp. 1963).
12 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann, ch. 156A, § 10 (Supp. 1963).
13 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 156A, § 17 (Supp. 1963). This provision is inserted in
recognition of the jurisdiction of the Supreme Judicial Court over the practice of law
in the courts of the Commonwealth. "Permission to practice law is within the exclusive
cognizance of the judicial department." In Re Opinion of the Justices, supra note'?, at
613, 194 N.E. at 316. Cf. State v. Brown, 173 Ohio St. 114, 180 N.E.2d 157 (1962).
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restrictions on business corporations practicing law or the professions are
in no way abrogated by this statute."
The professional corporation can be organized by one or more persons,rs
as opposed to the three required for this purpose under the business corpora-
tion provisions of chapter 156. 10 Chapter 156 requires not less than three
directors.''' While chapter 156A is silent as to director requirements, it
appears that a lesser number of directors is acceptable in order to effectuate
the design of the Act? There would appear to be a modified limited liability
in the professional corporation. Although personal liability is not annulled
by the corporate form when it arises out of the rendition of professional
services, there is, apparently, limited liability on general corporate contract
debts and on claims arising out of tort actions not associated with the rendi-
tion of services as, e.g., injury to a business invitee caused by negligently
maintained corporate premises.
Apart from possible tax benefits, there are no extraordinary reasons for
professionals to incorporate. The modified limited liability may be attractive,
depending on the fact situation. Also, the continuity of life possessed by a
corporation may eliminate some inconvenience present in a partnership
when death or other factors causes a dissolution? One final incentive to
incorporate under chapter 156A may be to avoid the joint and several liability
of partners for the act of one of them.2° In the corporate form, only the
person personally responsible and the corporation itself would appear to
be liable. However, the importance of this factor is diminished somewhat
when it is recognized that professionals, by reason of the personal nature
of the services they render, would likely be substantially insured against
personal liability, whether they practice in a corporation or a partnership.
Thus, even in a partnership, it is improbable that liability, arising out of
the act of one partner, would result in execution of a judgment on the other
partner's assets. Of course, these considerations must be viewed in terms
of the particular situation and the advantages balanced against any dis-
advantages as, e.g., in Massachusetts, the taxes and fees imposed on corpora-
tions.'
As previously indicated, the primary purpose of .enacting professional
corporation and association statutes is to permit professional people to
qualify for tax treatment as employees with respect to qualified pension and
14 See State Bd. of Accountancy v. Eber, 149 So.2d 81 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1963).
15 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 156A, § 2 (Supp. 1963).
10 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 156, § 6 (1958).
11 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 156, § 21 (1958).
18 Accord, Christian v. Sbideler, 382 P.2d 129 (Okla. 1963).
15 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 108A, §§ 29-43 (1958).
22 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 108A, §§ 13, 15 (1958).
21 Under Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 156A, § 14 (Supp. 1963), there is a seventy-five
dollar fee to be paid when filing the articles of organization. Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch.
156, §§ 47, 55 (1958), imposes a twenty-five dollar fee to be paid when filing the re-
quired certificate of condition at the end of the fiscal year. Also, the professional corpora-
tion must file an annual excise tax return, including any tax due, under Mass. Gen. Laws
Ann. ch. 63, §§ 30-50 (1958).
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profit sharing plans.22 In United States v. Kintner, 23
 it was held that an
association of doctors possessed sufficient corporate characteristics to qualify
as a corporation under the Internal Revenue Code. The association was thus
able to provide an otherwise qualified pension plan for the doctor-employees,
contributions to which were not taxable as compensation to the doctors. A
qualified plan allows the corporation to deduct contributions made to such
plans,24
 and the contributions made to the plan by the employer are not
taxed to the employee until the time fixed for distribution. 25
 In addition,
income from the fund established under these plans is tax exempt.2° The
effect is to defer compensation until a time when the surtax is less onerous.
Pursuant to the Kintner decision, the Commissioner promulgated regula-
tions formulating the tests and standards to be applied in determining
qualification as a corporation for tax purposes. 27 The regulations emphasized
that while the Code sets the standards for classifying an organization as a
corporation, it is local law which determines whether these characteristics
exist in fact. The regulations are concerned with the Kintner situation, i.e.,
whether an unincorporated organization shall be classified as an association
for federal tax purposes. Boris I. Bittker asserts, however, that to hold the
regulations inapplicable because of the state "corporation" label is "question
begging."28 Professor Bittker contends that the regulations are valid stand-
ards for determining ". . . when a self-styled 'corporation' should be treated
as such." 20 His thesis is that professional associations and corporations do
not qualify as associations because the statutes creating them generally
impose restrictions which prevent the corporation or association from meet-
ing the standards imposed by the regulations. 3° To illustrate Professor Bitt-
ker's general approach, reference may be made to the requirement of central-
ization of management. The regulations state:
An organization has centralized management if any person (or any
group of persons which does not include all the members) has con-
tinuing exclusive authority to make the management decisions
22 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 401-04.
23 216 F.2d 418 (9th Cir. 1954).
24 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 404 (a)(3).
25 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 402 (a).
26 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 501 (a).
27 Treas. Reg. §§ 301.7701-1, 301.7701-2 (1960).
28 Bittker, Professional Associations and Federal Income Taxation: Some Questions
and Comments, 17 Tax L. Rev. 1, 26 (1961).
29 Id. at 27.
so Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2 (a) (3) (1960) states:
An unincorporated organization shall not be classified as an association unless
such organization has more corporate characteristics than non-corporate
characteristics.
The characteristics referred to are outlined in Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a)(I) (1960):
(i) Associates, (ii) an objective to carry on business and divide the gains
therefrom, (iii) continuity of life, (iv) centralization of management, (v)
liability for corporate debts limited to corporate property, and (vi) free trans-
ferability of interests.
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necessary to the conduct of the business for which the organization
was formed.'"
As in the Georgia Act, which is used as an example by Professor Bittker, the
Massachusetts statute does not refer to management or define its scope in
the professional situation. However, section 11 of chapter 156A indicates
that the professional is still responsible to the appropriate regulating board
despite his corporate office, and the traditional responsibility of each pro-
fessional to his patient or client is maintained by section 10. Professor Bittker
questions whether there can be "continuing exclusive authority to make the
management decisions for which the corporation was formed," e.g., medicine,
if the individual doctors cannot delegate their professional responsibilities to
a fraction of their number. Professor Bittker concludes that there is at best a
"loose kind of centralized management" under such conditions.
The above illustration indicates that there are doubts as to the feasibility
of professionals obtaining corporate standing for tax purposes under the
present regulations, and aspirations of qualifying will doubtlessly wane in
view of the ominous reverberations of the Commissioner. The Commissioner
has reacted to the rash of professional corporation and association statutes
by proposing amendments to the present regulations. 32
 The amendments
appear to eliminate any possibility of achieving corporate status for tax
purposes under the Massachusetts or other professional corporation statutes.
With regard to the requirement of continuity of life, the proposed regulations
require that it must exist without depending on an agreement of the mem-
bers.33
 Section 13 of chapter 156A requires that purchase or redemption of
shares of deceased or disqualified shareholders be provided for in the articles
of organization or by-laws. Thus, there can be no incorporation without an
agreement by the members as to the purchase or redemption, and it is likely
that retention of corporate status would be contingent on the fulfillment of
the "agreement" on death or disqualification of a shareholder.
The regulations adopt Professor Bittker's contention that a professional
service organization cannot have centralization of management, as it exists
in an ordinary business corporation, and still maintain ". . . traditional
professional autonomy with respect to professional decisions and the tradi-
tional responsibility of a professional person to the client or patient." 34
Limited liability does not exist under the regulations if the liability of the
professional person to his client or patient is greater than the personal
liability of a shareholder-employee of an ordinary business corporation to
its customers. 33
 It may be argued that in many instances the liability of
a professional person to patient or client is no greater than that of a share-
holder-employee of an ordinary business corporation, especially where the
latter is a close corporation and liability is for negligence occasioned by acts
31 Treas. Reg. 	 301.7701-2(c) (1960).
82 Proposed' Treas. Reg. 99 301.7701-1(d), 301.7701-2(h), 28 Fed. Reg 13750
(1963).
as Proposed Treas. Reg. 301.7701-2(h) (2), 28 Fed. Reg, 13751 (1963).
34 Proposed Treas. Reg. 9 301.7701-2(h) (3), 28 Fed. Reg. 13751 (1963).
33 Proposed Treas. Reg. 9 301.7701-2(h)(4), 28 Fed. Reg. 13752 (1963).
624
CURRENT LEGISLATION
performed in fulfilling the corporate purpose as, e.g., a shareholder-truck-
driver of a trucking corporation.
The discussion of free transferability in the regulations concludes
with the rule that ". . . if a member of a professional service organization
may transfer his interest to a qualified person who is not a member of the
organization only after having first offered his interest to the other members
of the organization, the corporate characteristic of free transferability of
interests does not exist."88 Section 7 of chapter 156A does not require that
a shareholder give the other members of the organization the first opportu-
nity to acquire his interest. However, it is probable that the by-laws would
provide for "first opportunity" for the members of the organization. The
regulations require that the transferring member be able "to confer upon his
substitute all the attributes of his interest in the organization,"" i.e., the
right to practice, in order to have free transferability. The remaining mem-
bers would undoubtedly want to restrict ingress into their organization,
since personal qualities are so important to the success of a professional
venture.
It is obvious that the proposed regulations are directed specifically at
professional corporations and associations. The Commissioner's approach
appears to have been to pick characteristics peculiar to such professional
corporations and associations and to conclude that these characteristics are
"essentially different in an ordinary business corporation."88 While the
conclusion assumes the argument, especially since close corporations may
be very similar to the professional corporation by virtue of voting agree-
ments and restrictions on transfers, it seems apparent that the. Com-
missioner is bound to prevail. Professionals and other self-employed persons
have been striving to achieve tax equality with the corporate employee,
with respect to pension and profit sharing plans, for a number of years.
Congress finally responded by enacting the Keough Bill (H.R. 10)." This
bill amends the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, sections 401-404. The
enactment allows the self-employed person to treat himself as both employer
and employee, for purposes of the statute. The Keough Bill has not received
a warm reception because of the limitations on contributions and deductions
which do not apply to the ordinary corporate employee." The lack of en-
thusiasm does not alter the fact, however, that Congress has seen fit to deal
66 Proposed Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(h) (5) (ii), 28 Fed. Reg. 13752 (1963).
37 Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(e) (I) (1960).
36 This statement permeates the proposed regulations.
36 Self-Employed Individuals Tax Retirement Act of 1962, 76 Stat. 809 (1962),
26 U.S.C.A. /* 401-04 (1963).
40 Generally, amounts which may be contributed on behalf of an owner-employee
are limited to a maximum of $2,500 per year. The self-employed person is not as
limited in the amount he may contribute for himself, but in both cases, 10% of earned
income or $2,500, whichever is, the lesser is the basis on which deductions are deter-
mined. Both are limited to a maximum deduction of of $2,500. In addition, theie
plans must cover full time employees with a period of employment of three years or
more. See e.g., Rapp, The Self-Employed Individuals Tax Retirement Act of 1962, 18
Tax L. Rev. 351 (1963); Campbell, Self-Employed Individuals Tax Retirement Act of
1962, 32 Fordham I. Rev. 279 (1963).
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with the tax situation of the self-employed, including professionals, under
the Keough Bill. The congressional intent to limit tax privileges to the
self-employed within the confines of the Keough Bill will be sure to protect
the proposed regulations from vigorous attack.
From the foregoing analysis it would not be unreasonable to conclude
that the raison d'etre of chapter 156A no longer exists. There are, perhaps,
peripheral reasons for incorporating under this statute, but they are not obvi-
ous. The uniqueness of a professional corporation and the resultant lack of
case law in the area, make it fertile ground for litigation, giving body to the
statutory framework. It is improbable that many professionals will desire
to embark on such an adventure in view of the limited benefits to be de-
rived therefrom.
JOSEPH L. DE AMBROSE
TAXATION
THE TAXATION OF MUTUAL FUND SHAREHOLDERS
The increased number of relatively low income investors during the
past decade has focused special attention on the open-end investment com-
pany, commonly called the Mutual Fund. 1 This is not to suggest that large
investments are not made in Mutual Funds by individual shareholders, but,
rather, implies one of the original objects of the Mutual Fund. Professional
investment management simply cannot be afforded by investors whose hold-
ings are not of a very substantial quantity. Investment consultants, further-
more, are not interested in handling small accounts because of the percentage
fee basis on which they conduct business. The Mutual Fund was conceived
as a means of providing professional management for all sizes of investments.
To this end a relatively simple scheme was devised whereby investors contrib-
ute what they wish to the assets of the fund, receiving in return shares
or certificates indicating the amount of their investments. All the assets of
the fund are then turned over to investment managers who, for a fee, usually
a fraction of a percentage, invest and dispose of the assets among securities
according to the policies and purpose of the fund. The fund then passes
along to its shareholders the income from its investments as well as its
capital gains provided the latter are not reinvested. At any time the share-
holder can "redeem" his shares; that is, cash them in for their net asset
value which is computed twice daily by most funds. The plan is roughly
analogous to an agency relationship between the fund and its shareholders
although in this respect one crucial distinction is that the shareholder has
no property interest in the securities purchased by the fund.
Because of the unique structure and purpose of the Mutual Fund, the
fund and its shareholders are subject to special provisions in the tax laws
which reflect the "conduit" nature of the fund. Earnings and profits of the
1
 For all practical purposes the distinction between open and closed-end investment
companies is that the former will redeem its own shares.
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